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Abstract—Multi-application smart cards enable a user to have
multiple applications on her smart card. The growing trend of
services convergence fuelled by the Near Field Communication
and smartphones has made multi-application smart cards a
tangible reality. In such an environment, cardholders might have
number of applications on their smart cards and in case they lose
the smart card, they would lose all of the applications. Currently,
the recovery of a smart card based service might take from a day
to a week at best, during which time the service provider might
lose on business from the user because she is not able to access
the respective services. The proposed framework in this paper
enables a user to acquire a new smart card as she desires and
then migrate/restore all of her applications onto it — facilitating
her to recover from her lost digital wallet in a secure, efficient,
seamless and ubiquitous manner.
Keywords-Smart Card, GlobalPlatfrom Consumer-Centric
Model, Java Card, Trusted Computing, Performance Measure-
ment
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart card technology has the capability to have mul-
tiple applications coexisting on a single smart card chip in
a secure and reliable manner [1]. This initiative is generally
termed as multi-application smart cards.
In recent years the convergence of multiple services onto
a single smart card has gain moment due to an emergence
of Near Field Communication (NFC) [2]. The NFC enables a
mobile phone to emulate a contactless smart card. Therefore,
a user can use her mobile phone to gain access to differ-
ent services (i.e. banking, transport and door access etc.).
The GSM [3] and GlobalPlatform [4] specifications are also
evolved to support the convergence of multiple services in
the Issuer Centric Model [5] by including an entity termed as
Trusted Service Manager (TSM) [6]. The TSM is a neutral
third party that has the administrative control of the smart
card. The administrative control includes the installation and
deletion of an application from their (issued) smart cards.
In contrast the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
(UCOM) delegates the ownership of the smart card to its users
[5]. The term ownership means the privilege to install or delete
an application according to the smart card user’s requirements.
In such a dynamic and open environment where users can
have multiple applications of their choice also create certain
security and privacy issues [5], [7]. In March 2012, Glob-
alPlatform announced the initiative of a user centric ownership
model for smart cards termed as GlobalPlatform Consumer-
Centric Model [8]. This model is significantly similar to the
UCOM; therefore, the proposal in this paper also applies to
the GlobalPlatform Consumer-Centric Model.
One of the main features of the UCOM is dynamism
(wherever, whenever). This increases the potential damage if
the device is lost. To expedite the recovery process after theft
or loss, customers should be able to have their applications
backed up and then restored when required in a secure and
ubiquitous manner to their new devices.
A. Contribution
A backup mechanism enables a user to backup her smart
card contents. In adverse circumstances, such as losing her
smart card, she could retrieve and restore the contents onto
a new smart card from the backup. Furthermore, a similar
mechanism referred to as a migration mechanism can also
be used if a user decides to upgrade to a new feature-rich
smart card. In this paper, we propose backup and migration
mechanisms along with associated challenges.
There are some subtle challenges to backup and migration
mechanisms in the UCOM, especially in the case of card-
bound application leases1 that restrict applications to their
host smart cards. There is also a possibility that the remote
location (e.g. backup server) might not be tamper-resistant
and a malicious user could take advantage of it. Therefore,
it would be safe to assume that instead of transferring whole
applications (i.e. code and data), we should only transfer
application download credentials. These credentials can be
considered as authorisation tokens that are issued by the
respective Service Providers (SPs), so a user could use them
to acquire the respective application in future.
B. Paper Structure
Section II briefly describes the UCOM for completeness,
so the discussion in the paper can be self-contained along
with the motivation for the proposed framework. Subsequently,
in section III provides a description of the proposed backup
and migration framework for smart cards. In section IV, we
1Card Bound Application Lease: In this lease, a Service Provider (SP)
issues its application to a specific smart card and that instance of the lease is
bound to the smart card [9]. In this scenario, the SP will only issue one lease
per user, which she can have on any of her smart cards; examples of such a
lease may be credit card and (U)SIM card applications.
discuss the implementation and performance measurement of
the proposed framework on Java Cards. Section V, analyse the
proposed backup and migration mechanisms. Finally, section
VI provides the conclusion of the paper.
II. USER CENTRIC SMART CARD OWNERSHIP MODEL
In this section we begin the discussion with a short in-
troduction to the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
(UCOM) so the discussion in the paper would be better
followed without requiring any additional readings (referenced
work).
A. Brief Introduction
In the Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM),
the organisations that issues smart cards to their customers
have the ownership of the smart card as shown in figure
1. They control the contents and functionality supported by
the smart card [10]. However, in UCOM the user has the
“freedom of choice” in terms of content and functionality
on their smart cards. With content we mean the applications
that a user could install or delete from her smart card. The
functionality concerns with the capability of a smart card like
memory space, computational power, security certifications
and supported cryptographic algorithms etc.
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Figure 1. Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
In the UCOM framework (shown in figure 1), a user
acquires a UCOM supported smart card from a card manufac-
turer. The card manufacturer provides a capability list of the
smart card and the user chooses the card that best suites her
requirement. At this point the smart card might be a blank card
and it does not have any ownership credentials. The user would
first generate the ownership credentials and once the user has
the taken the ownership of the smart card it could then request
a Service Provider (SP) to lease its application(s). An SP is an
organisation that develops smart card application(s) and makes
them available to their registered customers to download onto
their smart cards.
Applications are downloaded to smart cards under the terms
and conditions of their respective SPs that are stipulated in the
Application Lease Policy (ALP) [9]. If the smart card satisfies
the stated ALP, the SP will lease their application to the user’s
smart card. After downloading the application, the user could
present their smart card at a services access point to access
the services provided by the SP.
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Figure 2. User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
Although a UCOM enabled smart card could be in any
form factor, in course of this paper we would consider the
configuration in which it is a secure element in an NFC
enabled smart phone. This configuration provides the highest
level of dynamic and ubiquitous access to several services
than the other configurations like a standalone smart card
(i.e. credit card form factor). In the later configuration, a user
might have to use additional hardware like a smart card reader,
computer or an access point (like an ATM) to install or delete
an application on her smart card.
B. Smart Card Architecture
The proposed architecture for a UCOM smart card is
depicted in figure 3 and this architecture satisfies the require-
ments of the UCOM discussed in [5].
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Figure 3. User Centric Smart Card (UCSC) architecture
Most of the components shown in figure 3 are either an
improvement to the existing framework or an addition to the
GlobalPlatform architecture. We use GlobalPlatform as the
base architecture for the components in this section. These
components modify the GlobalPlatform card specification to
accommodate the UCOM philosophy. For brevity, we will
only discuss the backup & restoration manager and Trusted
Environment & Execution Manager (TEM) in this paper.
1) Backup & Restoration Manager: The interface to the
proposed mechanisms in this paper is referred as Backup &
Restoration Manager (BRM). The BRM is implemented by the
platform designers (card manufacturers) and it communicates
with the external entities like backup server or other smart
cards. No sensitive data is stored in BRM, which is actually
stored securely in the TEM discussed in the next section.
2) Trusted Environment & Execution Manager: On a typi-
cal smart card, several mechanisms are in place to test and
verify the state of the platform (both software and hard-
ware). At the software level, GlobalPlatform card specification
has proposed the controlling authority (termed CA in the
GlobalPlatform card specification) [11] and the Mandated
Data Authentication Pattern (Mandated DAP) mechanism [11],
[12]. In the DAP mechanism, an off-card entity (controlling
authority) signs applications that are being loaded onto a smart
card, and this approval of the applications is verified by an
on-card entity referred to as the GlobalPlatform card manager
[12]. At the hardware level, the Known Answer Test (KAT)
for cryptographic modules mandated by FIPS [13] and similar
mechanism are deployed by the smart card manufacturer (i.e.
RAM test, and checking checksum of non-volatile memory,
etc.) [14].
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has initiated a work-
ing group to devise specifications for a trusted module for em-
bedded devices [15]. We propose the Trusted Environment &
Execution Manager (TEM) as a trusted module for embedded
devices like smart cards. The TEM is fundamentally different
from the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [16] and Mobile
Trusted Module (MTM) [17] in two respects. Firstly, the
TEM implements a self-test mechanism that includes hardware
parameters to provide remote attestation and a dynamically
configurable integrity measurement mechanism that is based
on a challenge-response framework. Secondly, the TEM is not
based on a static architecture; in fact, it enforces platform
security policies during the application execution rather than
just generating the hash (once) at the start of the application
execution. The architecture of the TEM is illustrated in figure
4.
Figure 4. Architecture for the Trusted Environment & Execution Manager
The concept of TEM is to group/provide similar and en-
hanced functionality that provides assurance and validation of
the platform to requesting on-card or off-card entities. The
TEM is independent of the platform configuration that is
mainly concerned with the smart card runtime environment,
which can be based on a technology such as Java Card
[18] or Multos [19]. A TEM does not have to be imple-
mented in hardware; it can be software-based and utilise the
smart card’s cryptographic hardware (the crypto co-processor).
The TEM requires access to the crypto co-processor for
encryption/decryption, signature generation and verification,
and random number generation. In this paper, we will not
detail the design of the TEM and restrict the discussion only
to the Backup Token Handler discussed in next section.
a) Backup Token Handler: The backup token handler
acts as a secure repository that stores the restoration tokens of
individual applications (if sanctioned by their respective SPs)
and sensitive data associated with the BRM. When a user reg-
isters with a Secure Backup Server (SBS) or wants to transfer
the installed applications from one smart card to another, the
BRM retrieves these tokens from the backup token handler,
encrypts them, and communicates to the intended entity (e.g.
SBSor new smart card). The details of this mechanism are
further elaborated in section III.
C. Motivation
The UCOM at one end facilitates a user to have most, if not
all of her applications onto a single smart card. This could help
the user to perform mundane tasks of modern life, without a
great deal of hassle that one has to put up when dealing with
a large number of different smart cards. Equally it also creates
the issue that by having all of the identities (applications) on
one chip increases the adverse effect if it is being stolen or lost.
The traditional procedure to get a replacement card in case
of theft or loss takes days or even weeks in some cases. To
align the recovery process in the UCOM, we propose a secure,
reliable, ubiquitous and on-demand recovery framework paper.
The UCOM enables a user to have most services that she is
entitled to use, including banking, transport, access control,
health and loyalty on her smart card. In such a scenario,
most of the essential services that are necessary to perform
even the mundane tasks might be on a single chip. Therefore,
in adverse circumstances of losing her smart card, a backup
mechanism will enable her to retrieve and restore the contents
on to a new smart card. In addition, this mechanism can also
(implicitly) block the applications on the stolen card from
accessing the associated services from their respective SPs.
To have a backup, ideally it is recommend to be stored some
place safe (i.e. a trusted third party) from where in case of
emergency it could be retrieved. Traditionally, in the high-end
computing environments (e.g. servers and personal computers)
entire applications along with operating systems can be backed
up. However, such a mechanism may not be suitable for the
smart card devices for the reasons listed below.
1) Applications on a smart card are considered as secure
access tokens to associated services provided by their
respective SPs. The smart card acts as an additional
security mechanism to authenticate the respective user
to the SP.
2) An application downloaded to a smart card is bounded to
it [9] and changing that without notifying the respective
SP would violate the terms and conditions of the ALP.
Figure 5. Overview of Backup Mechanism
3) There is a possibility that the remote backup location
might not be tamper-resistant and a malicious user could
take advantage of it.
4) Backing up entire applications might lead to the possi-
bility of application cloning by a malicious users.
5) A malicious user could simulate the smart card environ-
ment copy the whole application that is backed up in
order to reverse engineer it — retrieving sensitive data
and algorithms implemented as part of the application.
This issues is discussed in depth in [20].
Therefore, it would be safe to assume that instead of taking
a backup of the applications, it would be rational to backup
the application download credentials (i.e. authorisation token).
These are the credentials which would be issued by the SPs to
their respective users, so in case of stolen or lost card the user
could use these credentials to initiate an automatic application
download process. Such a mechanism is the core aim of this
paper.
III. BACKUP AND MIGRATION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe two mechanisms: backup and
migration. In the backup process, a user archives her smart
card’s contents (i.e. authorisation tokens) to a backup server,
which can be used to restore her contents to the destination
smart card - if such a need arises. In the migration process,
there is no backup server and the smart card contents are
transferred between a source and a destination smart card.
A. Backup Mechanism
In the backup mechanism the authorisation tokens issued by
SPs to their respective users are stored as a "backup package"
at a secure location, preferably accessible ubiquitously on-
demand. When a user wants to restore the contents of her old
smart card, she has to import the backup package; then the
individual applications will be requested from their respective
SPs automatically by the BRM of the new smart card using
the associated authorisation tokens.
In our proposal, a secure off-site backup facility is provided
by a secure third party referred to as a Secure Backup Server
(SBS). We do not consider that a SBS has to be an SP and
the only requirement is that users trust the SBS. A backup
framework overview is illustrated in figure 5 and described
below.
1) A smart card user registers herself to a SBS using the
Secure and Trusted Channel Protocols (STCPs) proposed
in [21]. After the registration, the BRM has the user’s
credentials and details of how to connect with the re-
spective SBS. The BRM and SBS will mutually generate
a shared secret that they will be used in future sessions.
As this shared secret is bound to the specific smart card,
it is only used for secure communication and not sealing
(encrypting) the backup package.
2) After an application is installed on a smart card, it can
initiate the request for an authorisation token. The appli-
cation will only request for the authorisation token if it is
sanctioned by the respective SP. We opted for two possi-
ble scenarios: restorable and non-restorable applications.
These types are inspired by the security policy related
to key migration in the TPM specification [16]. For
restorable applications, an SP will issue its application
with an authorisation token, and the (host) smart card
would only migrate this token to the destination smart
card or a SBS: for non-restorable, the respective SP will
not issue any authorisation token.
3) An SP sends its installed application the authorisation
token (if it opts for it) that consists of two sections as
shown in figure 6. The first section is a public section that
is not encrypted and it contains the SP’s URL (Universal
Resource Locator), authorisation token identifier, and
on optional section. The URL would instruct a smart
card where to establish the connection to download the
application. The authorisation token identifier uniquely
identifies the token and associated cryptographic keys.
The optional segment is made available for the SP to
include any housekeeping information if necessary. The
second section consists of an encrypted message that may
contain proprietary information that would ensure that the
token is genuine and is generated by the SP. Tis section is
encrypted by the SP with its token authorisation key and
the selection of this key is at the sole discretion of the SP.
The contents of this section include an application iden-
tifier, a user identifier and an application lease identifier.
The application identifier refers to the application that
was issued to the user indicated by the user identifier.
The application lease identifier uniquely identifies the
previous smart card to which the application was leased,
along with any associated data, including cryptographic
keys (if each instance of the application lease has different
cryptographic keys).
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Figure 6. Structure of authorisation tokens generated by respective SPs
4) On receipt of the authorisation token, the respective
application will forward it to the BRM. The BRM will
encrypt the set of authorisation tokens with a package
sealing key that is based on some secret that is known
to the user. It could be a password, a passphrase or a
biometric — something that the user could provide at
the time of restoration to prove that she is the genuine
user that created the backup package. This key would be
generated once, unless the user decided to change her
password or passphrase. The simplest way to generate
the package-sealing key is to base it on the user’s input.
The size of the key and password length is based on the
user’s choice.
At the time of restoration, the user will provide the BRM
of the new smart card with the credentials for the SBS. The
BRM and SBS will establish a secure relationship using the
STCP. Subsequently, the BRM will download the backup pack-
age (authorisation tokens) from the SBS. These authorisation
tokens are sealed by an encryption key based on the user’s
input. The BRM will request the user for the relevant input and
decrypt the backup package. After decryption of the package,
the BRM will retrieve one authorisation token at a time and
use its public section to connect with the associated SP. To
establish a secure channel and authenticate the user to the
given SP, we modify the STCPSP (discussed in [21]). In the
fourth message of the STCPSP , we replace the UCre with the
authorisation token issued by the SP.
Before an SP issues a new lease to the user, it terminates
the existing lease. This means that although the lost smart card
is still usable, the malicious user cannot utilise the application
on it to access sanctioned services. There are two protection
mechanisms that avoids the unauthorised use of the applica-
tions on the lost or stolen card. The first mechanism is on-card
protection based on the Personal Identification Number (PIN)
verification (if implemented). If an application requires PIN
verification before it executes, the usual protection mechanism
that disables a smart card (or application) if the user enters the
wrong PIN multiple times will suffice. Whereas, in the second
mechanism, the SP can simply blacklist the application from
access the associated services. If the application tries to access
the services, the SP can instruct the application to block itself
and if possible delete all data related to the particular lease
and user — only if the lost/stolen smart card tries to access
the SP’s services. One point to note is that in the UCOM,
an SP can only block and delete its application, and cannot
block/lock the smart card. Nevertheless, an adversary can still
use an application only if it does not require a PIN verification
Table I
PERFORMANCE MEASURES (MILLISECONDS).
Measures Card Two Card One Memory Usage
Token Acquisition 3198.71 3291.38 9856
Uploading Package 3213.57 3301.21 9892
Migration 3056.69 3193.58 8563
Application Restoration 3396.65 3526.32 9918
Note: Memory usage is associated with storage space used on the test Java
Cards and it is measured in bytes..
and live connection with the respective SP when it executes.
B. Migration Mechanism
In the previous section, we discussed the structure of an
authorisation token and framework for backup to a remote
server (e.g. SBS). In this section, we use the same authori-
sation tokens but this time for migrating contents from one
smart card to another.
Similar to the key migration in the TPM specification [16],
when a user initiates an application migration process. The
TEM of the source smart card establishes a secure channel
with the destination smart card via BRMs, using the Platform
Binding Protocol discussed in [22]. The destination smart card
then requests the transfer of the authorisation tokens from
the source smart card. The migration process first deletes
applications from the source smart card, then transfers the
authorisation token to the destination smart card. The applica-
tions will be downloaded on to the destination smart card in
a manner similar to the one discussed in the previous section.
This process is similar to the TPM key migration, except
we use a different protocol to the one specified by the TPM
specification [16].
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT
For performance measurements, we use the test bed con-
sisting of a laptop with 1.83 GHz, and 2GB RAM running
on Windows XP along with two sets of 16bit Java Cards.
For the emulation of the backup mechanism, the BRM, TEM
and smart card application are implemented on the Java Card
where the laptop takes the role of the secure SBS and SP.
Where in the case of the migration mechanism, the laptop
just acts like a communication bridge between the two Java
Cards and each card in a set takes the role of the source
and destination cards. The performance measures listed in the
table I includes acquiring restoration tokens, uploading backup
package to the secure SBS, migration between two cards and
application restoration. In the test bed implementations, for the
cryptographic algorithms, we have selected Advance Encryp-
tion Standard (AES) [23] 128-bit key symmetric encryption
with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) [24] without padding for
both encryption and MAC operations. The signature algorithm
is based on the Rivest-Shamir-Aldeman (RSA) [24] 512-bit
key. We used SHA-256 [25] for hash generation. For Diffie-
Hellman key generation we used a 2058-bit group with a 256-
bit prime order subgroup specified in the RFC-5114 [26].
For the acquisition of the restoration token and key gen-
eration & uploading of the backup package, we deployed a
slightly modified STCP discussed in [27]. For the migration
mechanism, we used the Platform Binding Protocol discussed
in [22]. For application restoration, as discussed in section
III-A we modified the protocol proposed in [21]. All the pro-
tocols that we deployed for each stage of the implementation
were slightly modified (in their implementation) to include the
restoration token and backup package.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE BACKUP AND MIGRATION
MECHANISM
In the smart card industry, there are not many examples
of contents backup or migration mechanisms that we can
compare with ours. An example is the backup mechanism for
phone-book contacts, but even this mechanism is not like the
one discussed in this paper. Although not the same, but the
TPM key migration architecture [16] can be regarded closest
our proposal. The application migration process is similar to
the TPM key migration and the only difference is that instead
of migrating keys, we migrate the authorisation tokens to
the destination smart cards. In the smart card industry such
mechanisms are not required due to the ICOM architecture.
The contents backup mechanism effectively prevents smart
card cloning and intellectual property theft. In smart card
cloning, a malicious user tries to copy applications from a
smart card to another card, without the permission of the
respective SPs. To prevent cloning of an application, the
relevant SP is given the ability to make its application either
restorable or non-restorable. Therefore, the choice of moving
the application to a new smart card is not with the user but
with the SP. Furthermore, the backup or migration mechanism
does not move the application data or/and code. In fact, even
when the SP sanctions its application to be restorable, the
mechanism still relies on the SP to issue an authorisation
token. Without this authorisation token, the application cannot
be part of the backup or the migration mechanism.
Intellectual property theft refers to the scenario where a
malicious user tries to obtain the application code (along
with data). To do so, the malicious user has to access the
application on a non tamper-resistant device with minimal
protection. Such a scenario can arise if we move the entire
application (code and data) off-card during the backup or
migration mechanisms. Therefore, by using authorisation to-
kens the backup and migration mechanism effectively prevent
intellectual property theft.
In addition, the lease of the application to the destination
smart card is at the sole discretion of the SP. Therefore,
after evaluating the operational and security capabilities of
the destination smart card, the SP can continue and lease its
application. Furthermore, the SP could first block the lease of
the previous application before leasing to the new smart card.
Nevertheless, there are certain concerns in the contents backup
mechanism that are related to the key that encrypts/decrypts
the backup packages. The framework requires the user to
input a secret value that could be a long PIN, password, or
passphrase that can be exploited by an adversary. To avoid
the use of weak user passwords it is recommended the SBSs
should take adequate measures by requiring users to choose
strong passwords. Furthermore, before a user can download
authorisation tokens from the SBS there should be some offline
authorisation (e.g. activation of restoration process on a SBS
over the internet or telephone).
The migration mechanism is similar to the backup mecha-
nism, except for one detail. It does not require a SBS, so it
avoids the need for user password-based cryptographic keys.
We consider that the BRM of a given smart card should
support both the backup and migration mechanisms.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we briefly described the User Centric Smart
Card Ownership Model (UCOM) and contrasted it with the
traditional Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model. The
open and dynamic nature of the UCOM enables a user to have
multiple applications on her smart cards which both increase
the adverse due to either damage, lost or theft of the smart
cards.
We proposed a smart card contents backup and migration
mechanism, which enables a card user to backup/migrate her
applications if required. The backup and migration mechanism
does not move the applications out of the secure smart card
storage location — in fact they only retrieve the application
credentials that a user can utilise in future to download the
application to her new smart card. Subsequently, we analysed
the implementation of the proposed backup and migration
mechanism.
In the smart card technology, such a mechanism is not
defined in its current state. Similar mechanisms can be argued
to exist in the (U)SIM environment but they only backup
the phone-book — which is not similar to the backing up
the applications from a smart card. Therefore, the proposal
presented in this paper is a unique of its kind in the smart
card industry.
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